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Abstract
There is considerable controversy, both within and outside the field of psychiatry, regarding the
boundaries of normal sadness and clinical depression. Furthermore, while there are frequent calls
for a "pluralistic", comprehensive approach to understanding depression, few writers have tried to
integrate insights from the spiritual, philosophical, and neurobiological literature. The author
proposes that such a synthesis is possible, and that our understanding of ordinary sorrow and
clinical depression is enriched by drawing from these disparate sources. In particular, a
phenomenological analysis of sorrow and depression reveals two overlapping but distinct
"lifeworlds". These differ in the relational, temporal, dialectical, and intentional realms. Recent brain
imaging studies are also beginning to reveal the neurobiological correlates of sorrow and
depression. As we come to understand the neurobiology of these states, we may be able to
correlate specific alterations in "neurocircuitry" with their phenomenological expressions.
Introduction
The field of psychiatry has always sought to incorporate
insights from disciplines outside the realm of biology,
notwithstanding the widespread notion that "biological
psychiatry" is now the field's dominant paradigm. To be
sure, recent advances in neurobiology–particularly in the
area of mood disorders–have cast a bright light on the
molecular and neurochemical bases of psychiatric ill-
nesses.
To some degree, this has come at the expense of other
modes of understanding. Indeed, some have upbraided
modern-day psychiatry for ignoring the psychological,
social and spiritual dimensions of emotional disorders.
These attacks, in my view, distract us from the overriding
task of integrating biological discoveries with a broader
philosophy of emotional dysfunction. Insights from both
the Western and Eastern spiritual traditions can help illu-
minate important aspects of ordinary sadness and patho-
logical depression. A phenomenological analysis of these
mood states can further enrich our understanding. Ulti-
mately, I believe that a pluralistic view of mood disorders
will aim at "mapping" experiential aspects of depression,
such as hopelessness or self-deprecation, on to specific
areas of brain dysfunction. In this paper, I try to provide a
broad outline of such an integrated understanding of
mood.
A brief spiritual history of sorrow and depression
Psychiatrists and psychologists are hardly the only ones
who have recognized the difference between clinical
depression and "normal" sadness or sorrow. The distinc-
tion seems to be as old as recorded history. Surprisingly,
in the Old Testament, the figure of King David presents us
with portraits of both severe depression and normal
bereavement. In Psalm 38, conventionally ascribed to
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"There is no soundness in my flesh...no health in my
bones because of my sin...my wounds grow foul and fester
because of my foolishness, I am utterly bowed down and
prostate; all the day I go about mourning...I groan because
of the tumult of my heart." [1]. Modern diagnosticians
would see in this description a picture quite consistent
with an episode of major depression. In contrast, after the
death of his beloved friend, Jonathan, the very same King
David is far from "bowed down and prostrate". Rather,
after a brief period of weeping and fasting, David is moved
to write a passionately stirring dirge, known as "The
Lament of the Bow" (2 Samuel 1:17–27), addressed to his
lost friend: "How have the mighty fallen...I grieve for you,
my brother Jonathan, you were most dear to me..." [1].
There is no trace, in David's lament, of the self-loathing
and bodily decay found in Psalm 38. David's period of
mourning after Jonathan's death represents roughly what
modern-day mental health professionals would call
"bereavement"–not clinical depression.
That life brings with it certain unavoidable or at least
"expectable" sorrows is a concept found in Eastern reli-
gious thought, as well. In Buddhism, for example, we are
told there are two roots of unhappiness in human exist-
ence: dukha and tanha. Dukha comprises the "...inevitable
occasions of unhappiness" that come with human suffer-
ing, frailty, disease, loss of loved ones, and of course,
death. Then there is tanha, which is translated as "blind
demandingness": that part of our nature "...which leads us
to ask of the universe...more than it is ready or even able
to give." [2] Very roughly, we can see the precursors of
normal and pathological sadness, respectively, in dukha
and tanha.
Similarly, the 14th century monk, Thomas  Kempis (1380–
1471) recognized that sorrow is sometimes appropriate.
"Levity of heart and neglect of our faults," he wrote, "make
us insensible to the proper sorrows of the soul." [3] Tho-
mas asks, "Is there anyone who enjoys everything as he
wishes? Neither you, nor I, nor anyone else on earth.
There is no one in the world without trouble or anxiety,
be he King or Pope."[3] Indeed, like many medieval theo-
logians, Thomas saw this earthly existence as a vale of
tears. He believed that, "...we often engage in empty
laughter when we should rightly weep." [3]
Four centuries after Thomas  Kempis, several Hassidic
masters also distinguished between normal and abnormal
degrees of sorrow. Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev
(1740–1810) wrote,
"There are two kinds of sorrow...When a man broods over
the misfortunes that have come upon him... [and] cowers
in a corner and despairs of help–that is a bad kind of sor-
row..." In contrast, "...the other kind is the honest grief of
a man who knows what he lacks." [4]
Similarly, writing at roughly the same time, Rabbi Simcha
Bunam of Pshis'cha (1767–1827) recognized the distinc-
tion between "a broken heart" and what he termed "dejec-
tion":
"For it is a good thing to have a broken heart, and pleasing
to God, as it is written: 'The sacrifices of God are a broken
spirit...' [Psalm 51:19]...God does not entirely heal those
who have broken hearts. He only eases their suffering, lest
it torment and deject them. For dejection is not good and
not pleasing to God. A broken heart prepares man for the
service of God, but dejection corrodes service. We must dis-
tinguish as carefully between the two as between joy and wan-
tonness..." [[4], p. 115, italics added].
Surprisingly, Rabbi Bunam seems to have foreseen not
only our distinction between normal grief and clinical
depression, but perhaps also that between normal joy and
hypomania or mania ("wantonness").
Of course, it is not always easy to tell "proper sorrows"
from intense grief, "pathological" grief, or clinical depres-
sion. Indeed, it is very doubtful that these are strictly
delineated categories. Furthermore, the nature of the puta-
tive "cause" or precipitating event is not a reliable predic-
tor of where, on this emotional continuum, a given
individual may end up. The loss of a loved one, for exam-
ple, ordinarily provokes sorrow and a finite period of grief
and mourning. Most mourners do not develop a severe,
intractable clinical depression. Indeed, in the Judaic tradi-
tion, it is expected that after the seven days of mourning
known as shiva, the bereaved will generally be ready to
resume some "everyday" activities (while refraining, how-
ever, from any kind of celebration) [5].
There are, of course, many exceptions to the generally self-
limited course of mourning; in principle, there are as
many kinds of mourning as there are mourners. The great
medieval philosopher, Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides,
1135–1204), appears to have developed a profound and
prolonged depression, after the death of his beloved
brother, David, in a shipwreck. Maimonides writes, in a
letter dated from 1176,
"On the day I received that terrible news [of David's
death], I fell ill and remained in bed for about a year, suf-
fering from a sore boil, fever, and depression, and was
almost given up. About eight years have since passed, but
I am still mourning and unable to accept consolation...all
joy has gone...whenever I see his handwriting or one of his
letters, my heart turns upside down and my grief awakens
again." [6]Page 2 of 8
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Just as the English scholar, Robert Burton, was able to
develop an "anatomy of melancholy", we can develop a
rough anatomy of sorrow. Burton himself recognized sor-
row as related to, but distinct from, melancholy. Citing
Hippocrates, Burton writes that sorrow is both "...mother
and daughter of melancholy [depression]..." and that the
two "tread in a ring...for sorrow is both cause and symp-
tom of this disease" [7] In modern parlance, Burton
describes a vicious circle, in which sorrow and depression
are part of a mutually reinforcing feedback loop.
But though the boundaries between ordinary sorrow and
significant depression are sometimes vague, there are
experiential or "phenomenological" features that help us
distinguish these conditions. For example, when we expe-
rience everyday sorrow, we generally feel–or at least are
capable of feeling – intimately connected with others. Thus,
Shakespeare has Romeo and Juliet parting in "...such
sweet sorrow" (Act 2, scene 2). In contrast, when we expe-
rience severe depression, we typically feel outcast and
alone. Sorrow, to use Martin Buber's terms, is an "I-Thou"
or relational experience; clinical depression, a morbid pre-
occupation with "me". Indeed, William Styron, in Dark-
ness Visible, describes depressed individuals as having
"their minds turned agonizingly inward" [8]
The sense of time is also different in sorrow and depression.
When we experience sorrow, we have the sense that,
someday, it will end. As Psalm 30 tells us, "Weeping may
last for the night, but joy returns in the morning." [1]
Commenting on this passage, pastor John Phillips notes,
"Sorrow is but a passing wayfarer who only tarries for a
night; with the dawn, he leaves and joy takes his place."
[9] In contrast, severe depression envelops us with the
sense that it will last forever. Indeed, Dr. Nassir Ghaemi,
drawing on the work of Leston Havens and Eugene
Minkowski, has called attention to the sense of temporal
distortion in depression; i.e., the subjective feeling that
time itself is slowed. [10] Havens observes that for the
depressed person, "...the future is lost, and the past
becomes fixed, immovable, bad, the place of irredeema-
ble mistakes." [11] Indeed, one recent empirical study
demonstrated that during depression, the experience of
time itself is slowed; in mania, it is accelerated. [12]
Sorrow, unlike severe depression, is curiously ambivalent:
sorrow has the capacity to contain joy within it, or at least
to find solace within its own essence. Sorrow, in this
sense, is dialectical: it generates an inward "conversation"
between hopeful possibility and foreclosure of hope.
Thus, when Martin Luther was confronted with the immi-
nent death of his beloved daughter, Magdalena, he is said
to have uttered these words to the girl, as she lay in his
arms:
"Lena dear, my little daughter, thou wilt rise again and
shine like a star–yea, as the sun! I am happy in the spirit,
but in the flesh I am very sorrowful." [13]
Another experiential difference between sorrow and
depression is brought home in an anecdote concerning
the writer James Joyce, and his daughter, Lucia, who was
eventually diagnosed with schizophrenia. Although
apparently apocryphal [14], the vignette makes an impor-
tant existential distinction. Supposedly Joyce had brought
Lucia to the eminent psychoanalyst, Dr. Carl Jung. Joyce
was perplexed, regarding the difference between his own
idiosyncratic thinking, and the convoluted thought proc-
esses of his daughter. Jung is said to have replied: "She
falls. You leap."[14]
Indeed, we might say that depression is to sorrow as falling
is to leaping. Put another way: we are overtaken by depres-
sion, but give ourselves over to sorrow. There is, in short, an
intentional dimension to sorrow. The priest Francisco
Fernández Carvajal tells us that, "...like love, sorrow is an
act of the will, not a feeling." More than that, Fernandez
insists, "Sorrow is a gift we must ask for." [15]
Sorrow, a gift? This counter-intuitive perspective is nicely
elucidated by the psychotherapist and former Catholic
monk Thomas Moore:
"Sorrow removes your attention from the active life and
focuses it on the things that matter most. When you are
going through a period of extreme loss or pain, you reflect
on the people who mean the most to you instead of on
personal success; and the deep design of your life, instead
of distracting gadgets and entertainments. You may be
more open to the beauty of your world as a relief from dis-
tress. Beauty is always present, but ordinarily you may not
notice it because of your priorities or your absorption in
other things." [16]
In contrast, it is very rare, though not unheard of, that
severely depressed individuals consider their depression
per se a "gift". Some, however, have found spiritual mean-
ing or sources of creativity in their depression. Dr. Kay
Redfield Jamison, a psychologist who suffers from bipolar
disorder, has observed that
"Artistic expression can be the beneficiary of either vision-
ary and ecstatic or, painful, frightening, and melancholic
experiences. Even more important, however, it can derive
great strength from the struggle to come to terms with
such emotional extremes and from the attempt to derive
from them some redemptive value." [17]
Nevertheless, the well-known association between bipo-
lar disorder and creativity (16) does not mean that severePage 3 of 8
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the depressive period and its effect on creativity is this
description from essayist Virginia Heffernan:
"Depression brought to me a new rationing of resources:
for every twenty-four hours, I got about three, then two,
then one hour worth of life reserves–personality, conversa-
tion, motion." [18]
Psychiatrist Richard Berlin MD, editor of Poets on Prozac:
Mental Illness, Treatment, and the Creative Process, has sum-
marized his experience as follows:
"The idea that depression might enhance creativity is a
myth, often based on the life stories and statements of
deceased artists and writers... Contemporary poets who
are alive and can tell us about their experience with
depression are consistent in reporting that it was only after
effective psychiatric treatment that they were able to create
at their highest levels." (R.M. Berlin MD, personal com-
munication, 1/27/08).
We have so far adumbrated four experiential dimensions
that help differentiate clinical depression from sorrow;
i.e., the relational, temporal, dialectical, and intentional
realms. But this analysis is hardly exhaustive; indeed, we
can hypothesize other phenomenological dimensions
that may help distinguish clinical depression from ordi-
nary sorrow. For example, do these states differ in the
realm of personhood? As Berlin points out, severe depres-
sion interferes with realistic self-assessment [19]. For exam-
ple, the severely depressed individual may describe herself
as "a total nothing," "a complete failure," or "a big zero."
In contrast, the sorrowful individual typically sees himself
as a complex and full-fledged person; i.e., as one bereft but
by no means rendered a non-entity.
Another (though perhaps related) phenomenological dif-
ference between sorrow and clinical depression may
involve what I call mortal vulnerability – the sense, in severe
depression, of being at the mercy of a hostile universe.
This is wonderfully expressed in these lines from a poem
entitled, "Depressive", by J.D. Smith:
Overshadowed by a blade of grass,
Soaked by one rain-drop,
Struck down by a dandelion seed.
Carried off by a sparrow...[20]
In summary, the sorrowful and the severely depressed inhabit
two quite different phenomenological worlds, though the
two "universes" intersect in certain experiential respects;
for example, both the sorrowful and the depressed person
will describe feelings of sadness and loss. The severely
depressed person, however, endures a unique kind of suf-
fering. Even though, as Paul Genova MD has observed,
suffering may be beneficially "transformative" in some
patients [21], others will simply be crushed by their suffer-
ing. Indeed, it is hard to find a better phenomenological
description of such soul-killing suffering than in William
Styron's account of his severe and intractable depression,
in Darkness Visible:
"Death was now a daily presence, blowing over me in cold
gusts. Mysteriously and in ways that are totally remote
from normal experience, the gray drizzle of horror
induced by depression takes on the quality of physical
pain.... [the] despair, owing to some evil trick played upon
the sick brain by the inhabiting psyche, comes to resemble
the diabolical discomfort of being imprisoned in a fiercely
overheated room. And because no breeze stirs this cal-
dron, because there is no escape from the smothering con-
finement, it is entirely natural that the victim begins to
think ceaselessly of oblivion... In depression the faith in
deliverance, in ultimate restoration, is absent..." [8]
A bridge from bereavement to clinical depression
A recent and very influential book, The Loss of Sadness, has
argued that psychiatrists, over the last few decades, have
"medicalized" sadness–in effect, lumping normal, adap-
tive sadness in with clinical depression, by failing to
appreciate the emotional context in which depression
takes place [22]. To be sure, the criteria for depressive dis-
orders in DSM-IV are almost certainly too inclusive, and
are undoubtedly in need of refinement. For example, cur-
rent criteria conflate cases in which major depression has
been present for only two weeks with those that have been
present a year or more. The categorical approach of the
DSM system also tends to create "pigeon holes" and pro-
crustean checklists of symptoms.
Notwithstanding problems with the DSM system, psychi-
atrists have been in the forefront of distinguishing the
subtle nuances of sorrow, grief, and depression, as well as
calling upon us to appreciate the experiential aspects of the
patient's mood states.
For example, Dr. Naomi Simon and her colleagues at Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital have described what they
term "Complicated Grief" (CG)–sometimes referred to as
"pathological" or "traumatic" grief [23]. The construct of
traumatic grief dates from antiquity. Indeed, we find trau-
matic grief eloquently represented in Homer's Iliad, as
psychiatrist Jonathan Shay has shown in his classic work,
Achilles in Vietnam [24]. (Curiously, Horwitz and Wake-
field see Achilles' grief as a prototype of "normal sadness"
[22]. From the clinical standpoint, this hardly seems plau-Page 4 of 8
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grief, after the death of his beloved friend, Patroclus:
"A black cloud of grief swallowed up Achilles. With both
hands he scooped up soot and dust and poured it on his
head, covering his handsome face with dirt, covering his
sweet-smelling tunic with black ash. He lay sprawling–his
mighty warrior's massive body collapsed and stretched
out in the dust. With his hands, he tugged at his own hair,
disfiguring himself." [Book 18, lines 26–33] [25]
Things go downhill from there: Achilles essentially goes
"berserk" and commits atrocities against his enemies, the
Trojans. When Achilles says to his mother, Thetis, "Then
let me die, since I could not prevent the death of my com-
panion..." (Book 18, lines 122–23) [23], he is expressing
a key element in unresolved grief, described millennia
later by Freud, in his 1917 essay, Mourning and Melancho-
lia [26]. Unlike ordinary mourning or bereavement, path-
ological mourning (what Freud terms "melancholia")
involves profound guilt and self-reproach. To oversimplify
Freud's thesis considerably, the survivor blames himself, on
some unconscious level, for the death of the loved one.
Dr. Simon and her colleagues have delineated a syndrome
that bears a close resemblance to the historical notion of
traumatic or pathological grief [23]. Complicated grief
(CG) is understood as a set of symptoms lasting at least six
months after the loss of a loved one, and consisting of :
• A sense of disbelief regarding the death
• Persistent, intense longing, yearning, and preoccupation
with the deceased
• Recurrent intrusive images of the dying person; and
• Avoidance of painful reminders of the death.
Notice that the first three features are essentially phenome-
nological criteria; that is, they reflect, and must be elicited
from, the patient's subjective experiential account. (Argua-
bly, the "avoidance of painful reminders" might be
inferred from the bereaved person's behavior). Similarly,
Simon et al also note that many individuals with CG often
report "anger and bitterness related to the death", and
"feel estranged from other close friends and relatives".
They "cannot find satisfaction in ongoing life" [23]. While
some of these features may remind us of Styron's severe
major depression, only a little over half of Dr. Simon's CG
patients meet the full DSM-IV criteria for major depressive dis-
order. Fully a quarter of all CG patients have no DSM-IV
diagnosis at all. Nonetheless, Simon and her colleagues
find that severe CG can result in significant social and
vocational impairment. Complicated grief might be
regarded, in our present state of knowledge, as a kind con-
ceptual bridge between ordinary bereavement and full-
blown major depression.
The biology of sorrow?
If sorrow, bereavement, pathological grief, and major
depression are distinguishable clinically and phenomeno-
logically, we might hypothesize that they also differ biolog-
ically. This might be investigated from two perspectives.
On the one hand, we might regard these mood states not
as discrete categories, but as conditions along a continuum
or spectrum of dysphoric mood and impaired function.
Ghaemi, for example, posits a "unipolar depressive spec-
trum" that distinguishes acute from chronic major depres-
sion; and single from recurrent episodes of major
depression [27]. (The terms "continuum" and "spectrum"
are often used interchangeably in the depression litera-
ture. Technically, however, a continuum denotes a progres-
sion of values or elements varying by minute degrees, such
as blood pressure readings (120/80, 121/81, 122/82,
etc.). A spectrum denotes an ordered arrangement by a par-
ticular characteristic, such as a spectrum of visible color
wavelengths. For our purposes, however, this distinction
is not critical). Based on the spectrum-continuum model,
we might hypothesize that mood states and disorders
would yield subtle gradations of biological differentiae,
rather than black-and-white distinctions.
On the other hand, we might posit a categorical separation
of mood states. The now outmoded "reactive" (exoge-
nous) versus "endogenous" distinction is one example of
a categorical classification of depression (though, in the-
ory, one could envision subtle gradations of "endogenic-
ity"). If we posit such a categorical separation of mood
states, we might also hypothesize binary or dichotomous
biological differentiae; e.g., "abnormal" versus "not abnor-
mal" laboratory values. Indeed, Taylor and Fink have pro-
posed that melancholia is a biologically distinct subtype of
depression, characterized most notably by abnormal ele-
vations of serum cortisol [28].
While it is too early to decide which model – spectrum-con-
tinuum or categorical – more accurately corresponds to
"reality", we continue to amass data on the neurobiology
of dysphoric mood states.
For example, the "neurocircuitry" of major depressive disor-
der has been investigated by several groups [29]. Although
a detailed review of this voluminous literature is beyond
the scope of this paper, the most robust and reproducible
finding using positron emission tomography (PET) is that
of decreased metabolic activity in the frontal lobes. Con-
versely, a return to normal frontal lobe activity is associ-
ated with improvement in the patient's depression [29].
Many other brain regions, including various subcorticalPage 5 of 8
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of major depression.
Unfortunately, the neurocircuitry of normal and spontane-
ous sadness, sorrow, or grief has received considerably less
study. Preliminary data suggest both regional similarities
and differences between normal sadness and clinical
depression. However, since most studies have involved
some method of "sadness induction" using visual images
or verbal cues [30], inferences regarding spontaneous, "eve-
ryday" sadness or grief are probably premature.
One partial exception is an intriguing study by Najib et al
[31], which assessed nine women whose "romantic rela-
tionship" had ended within the preceding 4 months. Sub-
jects were scanned using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) while they alternated between recalling a
sad, ruminative thought about their loved one (acute grief
state) and a neutral thought about another person they
knew an equally long time. Acute grief was associated with
increased activity in posterior brain regions, including the
cerebellum, posterior brainstem, and posterior tempo-
roparietal and occipital brain regions. In contrast, more
anterior regions, such as the orbitofrontal cortex, showed
decreased activity. Strikingly, the higher the subject's baseline
level of grief, the greater the decrease in anterior brain activity.
Some of these findings overlap with PET studies of depres-
sion [29]. However, in the Najib et al study, acute grief was
associated with decreased activity in the amygdala, whereas
most studies of depression have found hyperactivity in the
amygdala [31]. Replication of this last finding in sponta-
neous states of sadness or bereavement might point to dif-
ferent neurobiological substrates, compared with
depression.
In this regard, it is interesting that–in the author's experi-
ence – severely depressed individuals who have recovered
or achieved remission with antidepressant therapy con-
sistently report the ability to experience ordinary sorrow
or sadness. This might be interpreted as reflecting differ-
ing neurobiological substrates for major depression and
ordinary sadness. On the other hand, some research finds
that, in patients who meet DSM-IV criteria for both major
depression and bereavement, response to an antidepres-
sant [bupropion] produces a concomitant reduction in both
depressive symptoms and intensity of grief [32]. This could be
consistent with some degree of "biochemical overlap"
between depression and bereavement, in those who meet
criteria for both conditions. However, this does not rule
out neurobiological differences between those with
depression alone versus those with bereavement alone.
Further support for the biological separation of normal
sadness and clinical depression comes from very recent
research on deep brain stimulation (DBS) in extremely
refractory cases of major depression. DBS entails the
implantation of a tiny device called a "brain pacemaker",
which sends electrical impulses to specific parts of the
brain. DBS has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration for use in the treatment of Parkinson's dis-
ease and other movement disorders [33]. A small pilot
study by Mayberg and colleagues [34] found that chronic
deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the subgenual cingulate
region (Brodmann area 25) resulted in "a striking and sus-
tained remission of depression" in four of six patients
with very resistant depression. All patients met DSM-IV
criteria for major depression, and all had failed to respond
to at least four treatments for depression (medication,
psychotherapy, or electroconvulsive therapy). It is note-
worthy that, in an attempt to control for placebo effects,
the researchers performed a "blinded discontinuation" of
the DBS in one patient who had experienced an early and
robust response to treatment. After a period of about a
month–and despite sustained euthymia (normal mood)
on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale–the patient
began to exhibit a progressive decrease in energy, initia-
tive, and concentration. When the correct stimulation fre-
quency was restored (with the patient still "blinded" to
the procedure), the patient's energy, initiative and concen-
tration returned to pre-discontinuation levels within a
week.
One post-study finding from this research group is of cru-
cial importance to the "differentiation hypothesis"; i.e.,
the view that clinical depression and normal sadness have
differing neurobiological underpinnings. Dr. Helen May-
berg, one of the lead investigators, reports that, after these
severely depressed patients improve with DBS, they are
fully able to experience the normal range of emotions, includ-
ing ordinary sadness. Dr. Mayberg has found that in these
recovered patients, "...there is no interference with feel-
ings of normal sadness...". (H. Mayberg MD, personal
communication, 4/24/08). It is also intriguing that May-
berg's patients describe their post-DBS emotional reactiv-
ity as quite different from the emotional "blunting" many
of them experienced while taking conventional serotoner-
gic antidepressants or atypical antipsychotics (Mayberg,
personal communication, 4/24/08).
Also consistent with the differentiation hypothesis is a
study by O'Connor et al [35] that examined autonomic
function in subjects with either bereavement or depres-
sion. The bereaved subjects had all lost a close friend or
family member, within the past two years, with an average
period of about five months since the death. The research-
ers found that bereaved subjects showed significantly
greater heart rate than either depressed or normal subjects.
Not only did this study suggest a specific pattern of cardi-
ovascular response in bereavement, it also raised ques-
tions regarding the so-called "broken heart"Page 6 of 8
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viduals may experience sudden cardiac death. If such a
link were proved, it would certainly cast doubt on the
much-touted notion [20] that bereavement is simply a
"normal", "healthy" or evolutionarily adaptive response
to loss.
Najib et al [31] opine that we are already able–albeit in a
simplistic way–to "map" various experiential aspects of
depression on to specific brain regions. For example,
abnormalities in hypothalamic activity appear to correlate
with alterations in sleep, appetite, and neuroendocrine
dysfunction. Hyperactivity in the amygdala, they believe,
"...maps onto co-morbid anxiety and misperception of
danger signals." [31]. Are we so far, then, from being able
to map the patient's sense of existential isolation, hopeless-
ness, or defeat [31] onto specific, abnormally functioning
brain regions? The answer may become more apparent in
the next few decades of brain research. However, the diag-
nostic and therapeutic implications of such knowledge are
far from clear. It seems to me that whatever the PET or
fMRI findings may be in such a "brave new world", the
psychiatrist's existential encounter with the patient [36-
38] will remain critical in determining both diagnosis and
treatment.
Dr. Helen Mayberg, considering the available neurobio-
logical data, has opined that, "...we don't know how sad-
ness/grief fits into the continuum of major depression...
[however] the notion of normal circuits in a state of dyse-
quilibrium is at least tenable and the imaging data sup-
ports it." (H. Mayberg MD, personal communication, 5/
08/08). Moreover–notwithstanding the preliminary state
of the evidence–the hypotheses developed in this paper
allow us to generate a number of empirically testable pre-
dictions. For example, I would predict that among
depressed individuals who experience severe distortions in
the relational, temporal, dialectical, and intentional realms, we
are likely to find (a) a higher frequency of treatment-resist-
ant depression; and (b) a higher frequency of markedly
abnormal findings on fMRI and PET imaging. If such predic-
tions are borne out, this may have important treatment
implications. For example, severe distortions in the phe-
nomenological realm may someday point us toward espe-
cially effective neurobiological or psychosocial
interventions. In the mean time, the hypotheses devel-
oped here might encourage researchers to develop semi-
structured interviews or rating scales, aimed at quantifying
pathology in the phenomenological realm.
Conclusion
Though our mythic and literary heritage depicts ordinary
grief and clinical depression as more or less discrete exis-
tential categories, it seems more likely that these condi-
tions lie along a complex spectrum or continuum of
dysphoric states. Moving from less to more severe, we may
distinguish normal sadness or sorrow; normal grief; compli-
cated (pathological) grief; and major depression as gradations
along this continuum. Though this continuum may be
characterized by very subtle gradations, both clinical and
phenomenological features can help us distinguish nor-
mal sadness from severe, clinical depression. The syn-
drome of "complicated grief" (pathological mourning)
may serve as a conceptual and phenomenological bridge
between ordinary sorrow or grief, and major depression.
That said, both the components and boundaries of such a
proposed continuum may be subject to debate. For exam-
ple, should we exclude states of "normal sadness" and
simply consider more incapacitating dysphoric states?
And can we ever express, in objective terms, the subtle gra-
dations and almost endless range of human emotional
states? Certainly, the continuum proposed here should
not be reified or made into a rigid instrument of classifi-
cation; it is, at best, a heuristic tool in service of under-
standing the patient.
However we answer these questions, I believe that an
understanding of the phenomenological "lifeworld" of
the patient [36-38] must be incorporated into pluralistic
models of depression. In time, we may come to under-
stand how the phenomenology of depression and "proper
sorrows" relates to their neurobiological substrates.
Indeed, I believe that a full understanding of sorrow and
depression will synthesize insights from spiritual, phe-
nomenological and neurobiological perspectives.
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